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Social learning
Players switch preferentially to strategies with higher payoff
Replicator dynamics for population state
+ Occasional exploration (small random perturbation of
state)
No assumption of rationality
Evolutionary game theory

Peer Punishment
• After the Public Good
game, players can
punish each other: 
imposing a fine
at a cost to the punisher
Fehr and Gächter 2000,…
Peer punishment (with Brandt, Traulsen, Hauert, 
Nowak, Science)
Institutions?
‚Institutions are tools that 
offer incentives to enable 
humans to overcome 
social dilemmas‘
Elinor Ostrom
Understanding Institutional Diversity, 
Princeton UP (2005)
Institutional punishment
• Contracts
• Small-scale societies (Ostrom,…)
• Guilds, settlers…
• Janitors, custodians, wardens…
Pool punishment
Yamagishi (1986):
Players contribute G to 
punishment funds
before the Public Good 
game  
Defectors pay fine B
Pool  Punishment without second
order punishment
Pool punishment with second order
punishment
Peer against pool without or with
second order punishment
Efficiency traded for stability
Experiment: Peer vs Pool 
punishment
Boyu Zhang, Cong Li, Hannelore De 
Silva, Peter Bednarik
(Experimental Economics 2014)
238 students
Randomly assigned to 18 groups of 12-14 
players (toy communities)
Play 50 rounds
Groups isolated from each other
Within each group, students can choose each
round between alternative games
Optional Public Good Game
• PG game: 
• Players receive 3 €
• Can play PG game: invest 1 €, which is
multiplied by 3 and divided among all other
participants
• Can abstain from game: extra 0.5 €
Players can choose
(a) PG without punishment
(b) PG with peer punishment
(c) PG with pool punishment
(d) no PG game
Players are informed between rounds: how
many did what, and what was their payoff
Peer Punishment
• Players see number of defectors
• Can decide: Punish defectors? 
It costs a punisher 0.5 €
to substract 1 € from a defector
Pool Punishment
Alternatives:
• Contribute nothing
• Contribute 1 € to Public Good Game 
• Contribute 1 € to Public Good Game AND 0.5 € to
Punishment Pool 
(for each 0.5 to Punishment Pool, each defector is
fined 1 €) 
First and second order version
25 practice rounds
• 5 rounds (a) PG without punishment
• 5 rounds (b) PG with peer punishment
• 5 rounds (c)  PG with pool punishment
• 10 rounds full game: choice between
(a),(b),(c) and (d) (no participation)
50 rounds experiment
9 groups of 12-14 play first-order version
9 groups of 12-14 play second-order version
6 end up with peer regime: 3 from each version
6 end up with pool regime: all second-order
Toy histories
First order pool punishment:
3 out of 9 end with peer
punishment, none with pool
Second order pool punishment: 
6 out of 9 end with pool
punishment, 3 with peer


Time evolution
Cooperation
Corruption of Institutions
Jung-Hun Lee, Ulf Dieckmann, Yoh Iwasa
(JTB 2015)
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• Comitting and
noncommitting
cooperators
dominated (not shown)
Conditional Cooperator
wins
What if law can be bribed?
Anti-corruption campaigns
What if law can be bribed?
A committing defector can pay bribe B
(smaller than penalty A)
In examples, A>b>c>s>B  and b>c+s)
With corrupt law-enforcers
• Comitting and
noncommitting
cooperator
dominated (not shown)
Rock-Paper-Scissors
Bursts of cooperation
When law-enforcers can learn
Bistability
When players can also explore (not 
just copy)
Global stability (outcome depends on 
exploration rates)
With reputation effects
